What does the gamer do? by Davnall, Rebecca
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Ethics and Information Technology 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-020-09558-8
ORIGINAL PAPER
What does the gamer do?
Rebecca Davnall1 
 
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The ’Gamer’s Dilemma’ is the problem of why some actions occurring in video game contexts seem to have similar, albeit 
attenuated, kinds of moral significance to their real-world equivalents, while others do not. In this paper, I argue that much of 
the confusion in the literature on this problem is not ethical but metaphysical. The Gamer’s Dilemma depends on a particular 
theory of the virtual, which I call ’inflationary’, according to which virtual worlds are a metaphysical novelty generated 
almost exclusively by video games. Actions performed in virtual worlds really belong to the kinds of action they appear 
to—’virtual murder’ is a kind of murder. Inflationary theories are contrasted with ’deflationary’ theories which, in effect, 
consider video games purely as systems for generating images, and thus the gamer as (merely) a consumer of media images. 
Inflationary theories struggle to explain why video games produce this unique metaphysical novelty; deflationary theories 
fail to do justice to the intuition that there is some significant difference between the gamer and the consumer of other media 
forms. In place of either, I sketch a theory of the gamer as performer, primarily by analogy with stage and cinema actors, 
which I suggest captures more of the moral complexity of the gamer’s action.
Keywords Gamer’s dilemma · Video games · Virtual ethics · Virtual metaphysics · Performance
Morgan Luck’s ’Gamer’s Dilemma’ (2009) crystallised 
many of the key issues in virtual ethics.1 Like all good phil-
osophical problems, though, there is some confusion about 
precisely what the dilemma concerns. Claims about the eth-
ics of the virtual are entangled with a variety of—sometimes 
incompatible—theories of action in virtual worlds.
Luck’s original framing of the dilemma is as follows 
(please note that because one of the canonical examples used 
in the gamer’s dilemma literature is virtual child sex abuse, 
this paper unavoidably includes frequent mentions of child 
sex abuse):
Is it immoral for a player to direct his character to mur-
der another within a computer game? The standard 
response to this question is no. This is because no one 
is actually harmed as a result of a virtual harm … Yet 
this argument can easily be adapted to demonstrate 
why virtual paedophilia might also be morally permis-
sible, as no actual children are harmed in such cases. 
(2009, p. 31)
The dilemma for the gamer is whether to accept that there 
is a good argument for the permissibility of virtual child sex 
abuse, or to reject that argument and in so doing also render 
impermissible the virtual violence that typifies many video 
games. This framing assumes that the relationship between 
virtual child sex abuse and real child sex abuse is the same 
as between virtual murder and real murder; that the extent 
to which virtuality attenuates the moral significance of an 
act is independent of the content of the act.
Another, more technical, way of putting this is that for 
Luck the moral taxonomy of the virtual is isomorphic to that 
of the real, and virtuality merely attenuates it to some degree 
that is constant across the whole structure. The question of 
what virtual actions are permissible, then, comes down to 
how strong the relationship is between real moral kinds such 
as murder and child sex abuse and their virtual sub-classes. 
If the relationship is strong, then both virtual murder and 
virtual child sex abuse are wrong. If it is not, then both are 
permissible.
We need not follow Luck in framing this in terms of harm, 
though he is probably correct that the ’standard response’ 
outside academia would do so. Most ethical systems agree 
that murder in the real world is wrong; each system can pose 
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the question about in-game murder in their own terms. A 
Kantian (Tillson 2018) can argue that it transgresses a duty 
to respect life; a virtue theorist (McCormick 2001) can hold 
that it contravenes the same virtues as real-life murder.
My claim is that, against the tendency of the existing lit-
erature, Luck’s challenge will not be answered by choosing 
an alternative to his utilitarianism. The problem is not ethics 
or psychology so much as the metaphysics of morals: what 
are the ontological conditions necessary for the application 
of ethical concepts to actions, and do they apply in the case 
of virtual worlds?
If I am right, then we need to look closely at the assump-
tions Luck and others make about the nature of virtual 
worlds and how computers sustain them. Robert Seddon 
(2012) persuasively argues that the word ’virtual’ is obscure 
and obstructive; here I take up the investigation he proposes. 
Physically speaking, when a computer game is being played 
(in archetypal cases2), complex computer software responds 
to a user pressing buttons on an input device by generating a 
sequence of visual images on a screen, usually accompanied 
by sound and sometimes also haptic stimulation (e.g. vibra-
tions in a gamepad or other input device). The question is 
then what to make of these button-presses and the resulting 
images.
According to one view, which I will call ’inflationary’, 
these images constitute or represent a ’virtual world’, an 
entity which is ontologically similar to the real world. In 
its strongest form, most evident in Luck’s own writing, this 
position approaches something like modal realism (Lewis 
1986), or the theory of virtuality more recently proposed 
by David Chalmers (2017), effectively claiming that every 
video game sustains a complete world, different to and onto-
logically separate from our own, such that things which are 
true in that world are virtually true in ours. So, if it is virtu-
ally true that a character in a game (that is being played in 
our world) murders another, then there is a virtual world in 
which it is true that the character has murdered someone. 
Assuming that moral truths are not world-relative, the action 
in the virtual world just is murder, and the player’s instruc-
tion to the character to commit it implicates them in the act.
Aside from its obvious profligacy, this view runs into sev-
eral problems. How do we know what objects are present, 
and what states of affairs obtain, in virtual worlds? Which 
actions in those worlds is the player involved in? And how 
are virtual worlds to be distinguished from a more familiar 
category, fictional worlds? The gamer’s dilemma would be 
implausible if applied to other media—we allow far more 
nuance with prose and cinema violence—and inflationary 
theorists must explain why games are different.
This last problem, in a different form, also emerges for the 
alternative to inflationary views, which I will call ’deflation-
ary’. On this view, talk of virtual worlds is superfluous, and 
what matters, morally, is the images produced by a game, 
considered as images. For deflationary theorists, the gamer 
(merely) consumes representations in the same way that the 
reader of a book or watcher of a film does. Some deflation-
ary theorists, e.g. Patridge (2010, 2013), might be comfort-
able taking the gamer’s dilemma just as an instance of a 
more general problem in media ethics, but for others, such 
as Bartel (2011, 2020), games are distinctively problematic.
Several writers raise another set of moral concerns, about 
the development and publication of games which afford 
players violent options, but there isn’t space to address these 
here. Nor will I spend any time on the classic moral-panic 
question of whether playing violent video games makes a 
person more likely to act violently in real life, except to dif-
ferentiate the positions of some deflationary theorists from 
it. The empirical issue here is extremely murky, and the 
focus of the gamer’s dilemma is on whether there is anything 
wrong with wrongdoing in virtual worlds as such.3
What I aim to show is that neither inflationary nor defla-
tionary views really do justice to the ethics of the gamer’s 
actions. The gamer’s dilemma is not a completely new 
problem posed uniquely by virtual worlds as inflationary 
theories suggest. Equally, it is not reducible to conventional 
concerns about media consumption, as deflationary views 
tend to imply. A promising alternative, I argue, is to locate 
the gamer and the gamer’s dilemma within the ethics of 
performance.
I begin by extracting Luck’s implicit inflationary meta-
physics from his own writing about the dilemma (’The Infla-
tionary View’). I follow this with an analysis of two strate-
gies for establishing an inflationary theory of games (i.e. a 
way of differentiating them from other fictive media), one 
grounded in the supposed ’agency’ of the player (’Agency 
and Identification’) and the other in the ’realism’ experi-
enced by players (’Representation and Realism’). All three 
approaches, I argue, share the fundamental claim that vir-
tual murder is genuine murder in virtual worlds. I then sur-
vey deflationary views (’Deflationary Views’), positing a 
different dilemma; deflationary views end up denying that 
2 One problem that a lot of engagements with the gamer’s dilemma 
have is that they overlook the extremely wide scope of the term 
’video games’, especially text-based games and visual novels. There 
may be reasons for thinking that games of these kinds merit different 
ethical treatment to more ’conventional’ games, but in the interests of 
focussing on what has already been said about the dilemma, I shall 
leave these aside for now.
3 As McCormick (2001) has argued, absent a psychological effect 
much stronger than anything yet hinted at in the empirical literature, 
the psychological effects of any one individual of act of virtual vio-
lence must be regarded as trivial. Any ’media effects’ argument will 
not depend on isolated incidents but on long-standing patterns better 
accounted for in terms of media consumption than virtual action.
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the gamer’s action itself is problematic, either because the 
gamer is no different to consumers of other media or because 
all wrongdoing actually falls on the heads of game designers 
and publishers. Finally (’Does the Gamer do anything?’), 
I suggest that an appropriate way to attend to the gamer’s 
involvement in virtual wrongdoing might be to examine the 
gamer as a kind of performer; this account, I suggest, con-
nects the gamer’s dilemma to a more productive lineage of 
ethical debate than either inflationary or deflationary views.
The inflationary view
Inflationary assumptions can be subtle. To actually engage 
with the gamer’s dilemma in the form it is conventionally 
presented, one has to implicitly accept some inflationary 
premises, and they are hard to spot in retrospect. We have 
already seen one hint, where Luck writes:
A player commits an act of virtual murder in those 
cases where he directs his character to kill another in 
circumstances such that, were the game environment 
actual, the actions of his character would constitute 
actual murder. (2009, p. 31)
In a footnote, Luck claims agnosticism about the meta-
physics of virtuality and virtual environments, citing Brey 
(1999) ’if a narrow focus is required’ (2009, p. 31), but the 
phrasing here is not as innocent as he takes it to be. Games 
have ’environments’, and there is some sense in which these 
environments could be ’actual’. I take ’actual’ here as an 
antonym of ’virtual’, without the further implication that 
the virtual is a subcategory of the logically or physically 
possible.
From this, it seems that ’killing’ is a kind which has both 
actual and virtual instances, such that virtual killing stands 
to virtual environments as actual killing to actual environ-
ments. This is reinforced by Luck’s affirmation that features 
of the virtual environment moderate the ethical status of this 
killing-in-the-virtual-environment4 in just the same way as 
real environmental factors moderate real killing:
Note that our focus is upon murder, rather than killing 
in general. The difference being that, whilst the act of 
killing a person may be morally permissible, murder is 
not… Presumably a player directing his character, an 
Allied soldier, to kill an Axis soldier within the context 
of such a [game of WWII] battle, is not committing an 
act of virtual murder. This is because, were the game 
environment actual, we would not, by most reason-
able accounts, consider the soldier to be a murderer. 
(2009, p. 32)
This is the clearest example of the central assumption 
of the inflationary view, that things that happen in games 
belong, virtually, to exactly the actual ethical kinds they 
appear to. A ’virtual murder’ involves an act that genuinely 
belongs to the category ’murder’ occurring in a virtual envi-
ronment, and is of interest to us whenever it occurs, in some 
sense, at the player’s behest. I leave aside the long-contested 
question of the relationship between battlefield killing and 
murder.
From here, it is easy to generate the gamer’s dilemma. 
What determines whether a virtual act—that is, a set of 
instructions delivered by the player to a character through 
the game’s interface—is wrong is simply whether the result-
ing action of the character belongs to a morally bad kind. 
’Murder’ is a morally bad kind, and so is ’child sexual 
abuse’, so directing a game character to do either is bad, 
unless the boundary of the virtual is sufficiently imperme-
able that no moral weight carries over from either act. This 
naturally invites the question of why so many people seem 
to believe that virtual murder as Luck defines it is morally 
unproblematic, but that virtual child sexual abuse is clearly 
wrong.
Another way to characterise this is to say that on infla-
tionary accounts, the appearance or presentation of the act 
makes no difference to how it is to be classified or assessed. 
One of the first deflationary responses to Luck was Chris-
topher Bartel’s argument (2011) that what differentiates 
virtual child sex abuse from virtual murder is that virtual 
child sex abuse necessarily involves real child pornogra-
phy. In his original statement of this claim, Bartel does not 
clarify whether he thinks that virtual child sex abuse should 
be counted as producing or consuming child pornography. 
Instead, he says:
the graphic depiction of a character—who is clearly 
depicted as an adult—engaging in sexual acts with 
another character—who is clearly depicted as a 
child—would count as an instance of child pornog-
raphy. While these may be virtual instances of paedo-
philia, they are still actual instances of child pornog-
raphy. (2011, p. 13)
To this, Luck, writing with Nathan Ellerby, responds:
Bartel states that virtual paedophilia "necessarily 
involves the depiction of sexual acts involving chil-
dren". But this need not be the case. Suppose a com-
puter game were created in which acts of virtual pae-
dophilia were not depicted on screen, but nevertheless 
the game suggested (in such a way as to leave little 
4 As Seddon complained, the instability of the language of the ’vir-
tual’ is already causing problems here—per Luck, ’virtual killing’ is 
what the player does, and the character just kills, but here it seems 
necessary to specify that the killing being done by the character is 
confined to the game environment.
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doubt) that such an act had occurred… Such a game 
might count as one in which players commit the act 
of virtual paedophilia, despite the fact the act itself is 
never depicted… We take it that many gamers would 
want to prohibit games that allowed players to commit 
non-depicted acts of virtual paedophilia. (2013, p. 231)
Luck and Ellerby clearly take the same to go for virtual 
murder. Referring back to Luck’s original paper, they say:
Luck does not limit the dilemma to cases where virtual 
murder is graphically depicted. Luck does state that he 
is focusing "on those computer games, such as Grand 
Theft Auto, where clear instances of virtual murder 
are apparent." … Clearness in this context picks out 
our ability to say that the act of virtual murder has 
occurred; it does not pick out the depiction of such 
acts. (2013, p. 231)
Neither Luck and Ellerby nor Bartel should be taken as 
using ’depiction’ to refer only to visual depiction. Prose, 
narration and audio might also depict with or without visual 
images and still count for either argument. Instead, the disa-
greement is over how events in game environments are to 
be (ethically) classified. We can illustrate it by example of a 
couple of hypothetical games. Game A is an adventure game 
which starts with a prologue in which the main character 
trains his martial skills under his father’s guidance. The pro-
logue ends and the game’s story skips forward a few years to 
a scene in which the main character confronts the local king 
and accuses "You murdered my father!", to which the king 
responds "So I did."
Game B is a cartoony side-scrolling platform game in the 
spirit of the Super Mario games. In it, the ’enemy’ creatures 
are blobs of alien goop with eyes. When the main character 
jumps on them, they burst, splattering goo over the terrain, 
their eyes falling to the ground and going blank. However, if 
left on-screen long enough, the blobs eventually pull them-
selves back together and start chasing after the protagonist 
again.
Per Luck, the father in Game A is clearly murdered but 
it is not clear that the enemies in Game B are even killed—
Luck’s own example of a lack of clarity is the ghosts in Pac-
Man, who always return after Pac-Man eats them (2009, p. 
33). Bartel, on the other hand, would be more against Game 
B than Game A, because Game B is more ‘graphic’ (this is 
because Bartel’s approach is deflationary—he focusses on 
the ethical significance of the image that exists in our world 
rather than the gamer’s relationship to an act that occurs in 
a virtual world).
So the nature of a virtual act, for Luck, is not secured by 
what the images on-screen are like. Similarly, Luck denies 
that the nature of a virtual act is determined by whether 
the player recognises what is being represented. This denial 
appears in his response to Rami Ali’s attempt to dissolve 
the dilemma.
Ali acknowledges Luck’s differentiation of wartime kill-
ing from murder, then goes on:
With virtual acts, however, a further complication 
arises. This is because virtual acts have two different 
contexts. There is the in-game context of the act, which 
is the context of the game character in its virtual world, 
and there is the gamer’s context, which is the context 
of the gamer performing the in-game acts. (2015, p. 
269)
Here, Ali breaks the link between the act in a virtual 
world and the virtual act (between what happens in the game 
and the player’s involvement in bringing it about). Accord-
ing to Ali, the gamer can only be held accountable for what 
they take themselves to be doing, irrespective of how mat-
ters stand in the virtual world and from the perspective of 
its occupants. A gamer might play a particular game as an 
esport or in some other format where they mostly ignore 
the game’s narrative content. To such a gamer, overcoming 
the game’s enemies is a matter of navigating and removing 
obstacles rather than jumping on or shooting living crea-
tures, and so holding them accountable for ’virtual murder’ 
is unjust.
For Luck, though, this picture is incorrect. The nature 
of the player’s actions is fixed by the nature of the acts 
occurring in the virtual world, irrespective of the player’s 
interpretation of them. This is implicit in Luck’s assertion 
that ’a "clear instance" [of virtual murder] is simply an 
instance where it is apparent that the act of virtual murder 
has occurred’ (2013, p. 231). It is made more explicit when 
Luck, responding to Ali, posits a game in which ’one plays 
a convicted sex offender, with the ability to drag children 
into your car, grope them, and then throw them out’, and 
a player of said game, Cathy, who ’is quite an innocent-
minded person [to whom] it never occurs… that this is what 
is going on’. Cathy interprets the on-screen actions as some-
thing other than child sexual assault, but Luck insists: ’This 
is an instance of virtual child molestation. Why? Because 
the circumstances of the game… are such that, where the 
game world actual, the act would be actual child molesta-
tion." (2018, p. 158).
The obvious way to interpret this is inflationary—that is, 
to say that Luck takes the game to be an accurate but incom-
plete representation of a virtual world. This representation 
is uniquely authoritative in the sense that even where there 
is sufficient ambiguity that a player could form a different 
interpretation of the on-screen events, a player who did so 
would simply be mistaken, as Cathy is, about what is actu-
ally going on.
One problem with this is that, since Luck has insisted 
that the presentation of the game’s events does not matter, 
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no game can ever really exercise this authority. No game’s 
fiction is complete enough. Imagine a game in which the 
player controls the actions of a nurse. The nurse enters a 
hospital room and gives a patient an injection, after which 
the patient dies. It would be possible for the player (at least, 
without further context), to interpret this in two different 
ways. The player can interpret the nurse as a medical pro-
fessional with unfortunate timing, whose injection did not 
have the desired effect of prolonging the patient’s life. Or 
the player can interpret the nurse as a disguised assassin, 
injecting the patient with poison.
Either interpretation seems equally valid. Nor can more 
information actually settle the question. Say the game has a 
later scene in which an autopsy reveals that the syringe was 
loaded with poison. The nurse’s guilt is still not secure—the 
poison might have been put there by someone else. But per-
haps the nurse was negligent in checking for contaminants 
in the syringe? Perhaps the autopsy report has been falsi-
fied, because the pathologist is the actual murderer and is 
covering his tracks. Perhaps the nurse did indeed intend to 
poison the patient, and deliberately administered the poison, 
but the patient died of some other cause before the poison 
could take effect.
All of these interpretations and more besides are compat-
ible with the actual content conveyed by the game. There is 
the temptation to write at least some of them off as ridicu-
lous, as ’unreasonable’ interpretations, but to do so is to 
deny the ultimate authority of events in the virtual world, 
subordinating them to what is ’reasonable’ for a human in 
our world to interpret from a piece of fiction.
This is a significant problem if the ethics of the virtual are 
to be a matter of what real ethical categories events in virtual 
environments belong to. It also raises the spectre of another 
objection to inflationary views, by attaching to games the 
same concerns about interpretive authority over the content 
of fictions that have arisen in relation to other fictive media. 
Inflationary views require that there is an ontological novelty 
to the virtual, which sets it apart from all other forms, to 
prevent objections to video game violence spilling over onto 
violent classics of literature, drama and cinema.
The gamer’s dilemma, at least in Luck’s original form, 
requires that ’virtual acts’—directing a character in a virtual 
world to do something—relate to the resulting actions in vir-
tual worlds in systematic, consistent ways, such that the rela-
tive moral weights of virtual acts are proportional to the rela-
tive moral weights of their real counterparts. This, clearly, is 
not the case for any other fictive medium—whether reading 
about an act of murder or child sex abuse is bad depends on 
a great deal more than the wrongness of the act described. 
I turn now to the question of whether games can be clearly 
and rigidly separated from all other fictive media.
Agency and identification
The standard way of isolating video games from other 
media is to claim that gamers are active in a way that audi-
ences for other media forms are not. Games, we are told, 
are interactive, where books and films are passive; gamers 
employ genuine agency in their play. Outside the literature 
on the Gamer’s Dilemma, this claim has been extensively 
contested, but in the interests of brevity I shall not draw on 
these discussions in any depth.
The best illustration of the problems raised by this claim 
about agency comes from a recent paper by John Tillson 
(2018). Tillson takes an unusually austere Kantian stance on 
virtual violence, arguing that all game portrayals of violence 
show disrespect to other living beings and are therefore 
immoral. No such principle could reasonably be applied to 
any other narrative medium, and so it is especially important 
for Tillson to establish that games are different. He writes:
A representation is a simulation in the sense I mean, iff 
it is agential in the sense that a player selects actions to 
be undertaken by the player’s character(s) (i.e. it com-
prises agential affordances). Put another way, simu-
lations comprise agential affordances for at least one 
player (usually via an avatar). To simulate wrongdoing 
is to direct one’s character to perpetrate some wrong 
(something that would be wrong if it were done outside 
of a simulation). (2018, p. 3)
The final sentence here is a close paraphrase of Luck’s 
‘were the environment actual’, discussed at the start of the 
previous section. The only difference is the omission of the 
explicit reference to the game’s ‘environment’. Perhaps wary 
of exactly these ontological commitments, Tillson avoids 
talk of environments altogether. However, his sentiment still 
appeals to taxonomical consistency between immoral acts 
in the real world and—in Tillson’s terms—the simulation 
of immoral acts.
The main questions raised by this passage, though, relate 
to the first two sentences.Tillson does not attribute to the 
player of a violent game Luck’s act of ‘virtual murder’; 
instead, the player ‘simulates wrongdoing’ (rather than 
‘committing simulated wrongdoing’) via a relationship to 
one or more specific entities within the simulation.5 I take it 
that to say a simulation ‘comprises agential affordances’ is 
to say that the player makes choices about the content of the 
simulation; this is supported by Tillson’s later remark that:
5 There is a question here of how entities within a simulation are to 
be individuated—what is it, for example, to count as a character in a 
simulation rather than an inanimate object, or some other pattern of 
software behaviours. I shall return to this in the next section.
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Part of simulating an action on my understanding is an 
interactive interface, so that it is not merely imagined. 
Instead, there is some external information system 
that affords actions and is updated with information 
of one’s having acted. (2018, p. 3)
Here it is clearly player actions that matter, and they mat-
ter whenever an ’external information system’ changes in 
response to them. There is nothing in this second quote to 
tell us about which in-game acts the player may be held 
accountable for. In the previous quote, there is an ambigu-
ity: in the first sentence, a player always acts through one or 
more characters, but in the second, the player’s wrongdo-
ing is only ’usually’ done through an avatar. If an avatar or 
character is essential for wrongdoing, then Tillson has two 
problems: first, the many interesting cases where there seems 
to be no ’player character’, and second, a question of what 
makes a certain character the player’s. If a player character is 
not essential, however, the distinction Tillson needs between 
games and other media is hard to maintain.
Most discussions of computer game violence focus on 
a very narrow subset of games in which it is possible to 
commit acts of violence—the games, such as first-person 
shooters like DOOM and third-person mayhem games like 
Grand Theft Auto, which have attracted the most headlines. 
But there are plenty of alternatives, including one which 
is familiar to all my students but almost completely absent 
from the literature, which comes from the massively popular 
The Sims series.
In The Sims games, the player does not directly control 
any characters in the environment. Instead, at the start of 
a game, the player creates one or more virtual people—
’sims’—and is then charged with controlling these sims’ 
environment in order to enable the sims to prosper in school, 
work, love and many other aspects of life. Sims thrive when 
their biological needs are met, and die without. A famous6 
pattern of play in earlier titles (prevented by developers since 
the series’ fourth major instalment) was to wait until a sim 
had entered a swimming pool and then delete all the ladders 
allowing them to get out. Sims were unable to get out of the 
pool without a ladder, and would drown.
There are many other, similar examples. As a child, I 
would carefully choreograph crashes between my own trains 
in Transport Tycoon. Players of Theme Park and Roller-
coaster Tycoon sometimes deliberately build rollercoast-
ers that exceed safety limits, throwing passengers to their 
deaths. In Black and White, the player takes on the role of 
a disembodied god, and one way to secure worshippers is 
to terrorise them through violence. One assumes that Till-
son, at least, would want to condemn such acts, but they 
are excluded if a player-character or avatar is essential for 
wrongdoing.
The other problem for Tillson, if player-characters are 
essential, is that of identifying which characters are relevant. 
Tillson addresses this question almost entirely negatively:
In particular, it does not matter for the distinction 
whether one identifies with their avatar, or identifies 
with them any more than they might identify with the 
lead character of a film. The distinction turns entirely 
on whether or not one is able to direct a character to 
undertake actions. It does not matter whether the expe-
rience is immersive, affords one a sense of ‘presence’, 
or whether one has a sense of embodiment within the 
game. (2018, p. 3)
These exclusions are necessary because previous attempts 
to appeal to them have revealed that none of them are uni-
versal (most, at very least, exclude the ’god’, ’tycoon’ and 
’sim’ genres already discussed above). All that matters is 
that a player ‘directs’ a character to take actions—but what 
constitutes ‘directing’? Consider again game A, outlined in 
the previous section. The player may not know, as they com-
plete the objectives of the game’s prologue, that doing so 
will result in the king murdering the protagonist’s father. It 
seems, though, as if on Tillson’s picture the player has nev-
ertheless directed the king to do so. The player has directed 
the events of the game to proceed, as part of which the king 
has killed the father.
Let us assume the player has not played the game before; 
according to Tillson they have just unknowingly, uninten-
tionally committed (virtual) murder. In no other circum-
stance that I know of can an act be called murder if its agent 
neither willed in any way nor even knew of the killing that 
occurred. The player can hardly even be called culpably 
negligent, unless we are to hold that one should look up 
whether there are any murders in a game before playing it, 
and completely abstain if there are.
Tillson’s rejections of narrative (’identification’) and 
phenomenal connections between the player and specific 
individuals in the game’s fiction leave him without a way to 
deny that the player is implicated in the king’s action. Even 
if one could be found, Game A can easily be modified to 
pose the same question, by making it a game in which the 
player ’controls’ multiple characters at once (as many role-
playing games allow).
Say that, in the prologue of Game A, the protagonist and 
his father go exploring in a nearby cave. They are joined by 
a mysterious stranger, and for as long as the three are adven-
turing together, the player has full control over the stranger’s 
actions. At the climax of the prologue, the stranger reveals 
himself to be the king, betrays the protagonist and murders 
6 I cannot offer quantitative data to back up this claim to popularity, 
but the pattern is well-enough recognised that I can use it as an exam-
ple not only in games-specific teaching but also in general philosophy 
classes and have most students recognise it immediately.
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his father. The game cuts to black at this point and the next 
scene is the youth’s confrontation with the king some years 
later. Again, Tillson would have to say that the player has 
committed virtual murder even if the player never again con-
trols the king’s actions.
As with Luck, it is only the content of the game’s fiction 
that determines the moral valence of the gamer’s play. It 
doesn’t matter how the player experiences or understands 
what they are doing as they push buttons on their controller; 
if they cause the fiction to proceed and the king murders 
the father, they have virtually murdered, or simulated mur-
dering, the father. This is supported by another remark of 
Tillson’s, which implicitly abandons reliance on any specific 
player-character relationship:
Ordinarily there are a range of action options which 
the player can select from, but even if there is a choice 
between selecting just one action and not playing, this 
could still count as simulating wrongdoing in that one 
initiates the character’s action. (2018, p. 3)
Taking Tillson at his word here collapses the very distinc-
tion between games and other media on which his overall 
case rests. A film or TV show, watched at home on DVD, is 
an information system, external to its audience and respon-
sive at least to their pressing the ’play’ button—and thereby 
directing the characters to take whatever actions the narra-
tive attributes to them. Plausibly, the same is true of a book, 
though in this case the information is generally not stored 
digitally.
Tillson explicitly denies that merely reading a book 
which describes, or watching a film which depicts, horrific 
acts—his example is Schindler’s List—is inherently morally 
wrong. He says:
Rather, any disrespectfulness evident in reading such 
descriptions would have to consist not in the fact of 
reading, but in the attitude that one has to the wrong 
represented… While one certainly could watch Schin-
dler’s List in a disrespectful way, perhaps cheering 
through murders, or jeering at lucky escapes, no such 
inappropriate emotions need to be had for there to be a 
pro tanto wrong in the act of playing the hypothetical 
videogame. (2018, p. 10)
But as we have seen, given Tillson’s own restrictions, this 
difference between video games and books or films cannot 
be clearly maintained. The matter of the player’s attitude 
to in-game events will resurface in relation to deflationary 
views, but at very least there is the logical possibility of a 
player playing a violent video game without the presence of 
such problematic attitudes.
The inflationary attempt to claim that the gamer employs 
genuine agency, in contrast to the consumer of other media, 
fails because it is not possible to give a clear account of what 
this agency consists in. Any attempt to offer an explicit and 
precise formal definition inevitably excludes at least some 
relevant examples, or becomes so general that it fails to 
exclude the watcher of a movie or reader of a book. Many 
gamers, of course, report that playing a game feels different 
to watching a film; the last attempt to establish an inflation-
ary metaphysics which I will discuss, Philip Brey’s, relies 
on this feeling.
Representation and realism
Luck calls Brey’s account of virtuality ’suitable’ (2009, p. 
31) if specificity is required, probably recognising that Brey 
focusses on not just virtual worlds but the kind of virtual 
worlds sustained by ’virtual reality’ technologies (that is, 
computers that use a headset display rather than a monitor 
screen). However, the details of Brey’s ontological picture, 
though they reveal further flaws in Luck’s account, stand at 
some distance from it.
Brey’s central concern is the question of realism. For 
Brey, what makes virtual reality systems ethically distinc-
tive is that:
There is an experienced similarity between real-world 
actions and actions in VR. This similarity is greatest in 
highly-immersive VR systems (1999, p. 8)
Because this realism is cast here explicitly as an experien-
tial phenomenon, there is already a sense in which we have 
moved away from inflationary metaphysics; one can read 
Brey as more concerned with how the images produced by 
a game affect the player as experiential subject. However, 
the case Brey builds from here, across a number of arti-
cles, clearly attributes a great deal of work to details of how 
the game software operates rather than to player psychol-
ogy, and so I think it is still appropriate to class his view as 
inflationary.
The similarity Brey appeals to is one part audiovisual—a 
VR headset allows a game’s display to take up more of the 
player’s visual field, and to blindfold the remainder, and will 
generally come with earphones which allow at least limited 
surround sound effects—and one part proprioceptive—VR 
systems often (and Brey anticipates this becoming ubiqui-
tous) have control systems which track the position of player 
limbs directly rather than relying on buttons or joysticks. 
There is nothing about these technological differences which 
intrinsically connects with the content of VR experiences; in 
Brey’s definition, a player of a VR game can ’realistically’ 
cast spells or pilot exotic alien spacecraft.
Luck, as we have seen, insists that an event that happens 
off-screen may be just as morally problematic as one dis-
played with the highest degree of ’realism’. For Brey, this 
is not the case; it is only those in-game actions experienced 
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by the player as ’realistic’ which can be morally assessed. 
Indeed, Brey at times goes further, insisting that realism 
requires a ’first-person perspective’, defined thus:
A first-person perspective, finally, entails that the envi-
ronment is perceived and interacted with from a single 
locus. A first-person perspective suggests a degree of 
immersion in a world, rather than the experience of 
the world as an object that can be (partially) controlled 
from the outside. (1999, p. 6)
This is Brey’s attempt to define the kind of link between 
the player and a specific character in the game that Tillson’s 
account stumbled over. Similar problems arise here, espe-
cially the problem of overzealous exclusions. The Grand 
Theft Auto series, probably the most commonly-discussed 
example of video game violence, has never used a first-per-
son perspective, at least as the term ’first-person perspective’ 
is conventionally used. Taking Brey’s specification more 
generally, in terms of ’a single locus’, risks trivialising it, 
since a player can ultimately only take in one display at a 
time regardless of what kind of images the game puts on it.
The examples from The Sims and other god games dis-
cussed in the previous section also fall outside this defi-
nition. It is possible to grow ’immersed’ in playing these 
games, in the sense that one’s attention can be captured so 
that one loses track of time and so on, but this is not an 
intrinsic power of any particular technology—a huge range 
of other media experiences are immersive in this sense.
As for the more general phenomenal similarity between 
on-screen events in a video game or VR game and ’real’ 
experience, this certainly was not as compelling in 1999 as 
Brey claims. Even now, only the most expensive VR head-
sets can display images at a high enough resolution to trick 
the human eye, and doing so with any degree of fluidity 
requires enormous computing power. The more detail that 
is required in a scene, the higher this requirement becomes.
Coupled with Brey’s claims about interactivity, this limi-
tation is a problem. He defines this long-contested concept 
as follows:
Interactivity entails that the represented environment 
must allow for manipulation and navigation. Manipu-
lation implies the modification of aspects of the envi-
ronment in a fairly direct way, for example by clicking 
on them with a mouse or by grabbing them through 
the use of data gloves. Navigation implies the ability 
to change the location from which one perceives and 
manipulates features of the environment, including 
the ability to perceive objects from different angles. 
(1999, p. 6)
A few pages on, Brey offhandedly claims that "repre-
sented items in VR environments are (usually) interactive" 
(1999, p. 10). And 4 years later, he says:
At first glance, virtual worlds contain many of the 
same kinds of entities found in the real world. They 
may contain spaces, trees, desks, chairs, pencils, dogs, 
written messages, conversations, money, words, and 
so forth… [These] virtual objects are not just fictional 
objects, because they often have rich perceptual fea-
tures and, more importantly, they are interactive: they 
can be manipulated, they respond to our actions, and 
they may stand in causal relationships to other entities. 
(2003, p. 276–7)
Unless we take his definition of interactivity in the thin-
nest possible sense, these claims cannot be reconciled with 
the realities of video game environments. In many video 
games, the vast majority of things in any given scene will 
not be interactive. A flowerbed or lawn is unlikely to consist 
of individual leaves or petals, or even individual plants—
instead, it will be a flat colour pattern which looks about 
right until inspected closely. The drawers of a filing cabi-
net, or the books on a shelf, will be effectively painted on 
to the flat surface of a solid cuboid. Video games which 
do not avail themselves of these shortcuts must either look 
extremely sparse, render all their objects in low detail, or 
place impossible demands on their hardware.
To put this slightly differently, we could differentiate 
between the perspective of an ’immersed’ player and the 
game’s designer (or anyone else who has reason to pay atten-
tion to the structure of the game’s software). To an immersed 
player, the books on a shelf are objects—but they are not 
interactive except in the minimal sense that the player can 
move their view along the rows of spines. To the game’s 
designer, the books are not individual objects, but much of 
the immersion on which Brey places such high importance 
is lost. So are there books in the game or not?
If this problem seems trivial in terms of books, it is one 
tip of a dangerous iceberg (another is Luck’s claims about 
’clarity’ discussed above). Its general form is the question of 
how we determine what kind of action has occurred. What 
makes it the case that a sequence of game images constitutes 
a virtual murder?
Murder, roughly, is the deliberate killing of a person. 
Where we place the ’virtual’ in transferring this definition 
to the virtual makes quite a difference to the act we are talk-
ing about. If virtual murder is the deliberate virtual killing 
of a person, then it can only ever occur in virtual worlds 
where there are multiple people—with present technology, 
this would be limited to multiplayer games, and thus only 
tangentially related to the kinds of cases captured by the 
gamer’s dilemma (see Ryland 2019 for discussion on this). 
To speak of ’killing’ a virtual person seems an inflation, 
since the life that is ended is only a virtual life.
Instead, for absolute clarity, we must speak of the deliber-
ate virtual killing of a virtual person (even the deliberation 
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may be virtual—most in-game killing has no alternative 
except not playing). This poses the question of what deter-
mines that a certain in-game entity is a (virtual) person, and 
a certain in-game event a (virtual) killing.
If the victim of the act is a character in the game’s narra-
tive, and the process within the game’s code that is activated 
is titled ’death’, then it is almost impossible to refer to the 
event as anything other than a killing. But many in-game 
acts are not like this; think of the goop enemies in ’Game B’, 
described above in reference to Bartel. Even if the game’s 
code refers to what happens when they burst as ’death’, or a 
state variable associated with an individual enemy changes 
from ’alive’ to ’dead’, these creatures’ eventual, and routine, 
reanimation suggests that ’death’ is the wrong word.
Another challenge to the personhood of these enemies 
is their lack of individuality. Even in games where one can 
’kill’ in-game entities that look like people, such as the 
Grand Theft Auto games, in terms of the game’s code the fig-
ures are only very basic automata. Video games are largely 
smoke and mirrors; the pedestrians in a Grand Theft Auto 
game do not have jobs, families, homes or communities, 
they simply walk from point A to point B and then disap-
pear. They might leap out of the way of an oncoming car, 
but if hit they do not incur medical bills; if killed they leave 
no bereaved loved ones.
Nor are these entities ontologically persistent. When a 
player enters an area, the software will populate it with walk-
ing figures. If the player leaves the area, those figures will 
be removed from the game’s state (is this virtual killing? If 
not, why not?), and if the player returns later, new figures 
unrelated to the first set will manifest.7 Indeed, if a player 
saves their game, stops playing and turns their hardware off, 
the game may not save the states of these space-filling fig-
ures, instead simply generating a new set when the player 
next loads.
Even where a game’s narrative is clear that a murder has 
occurred, the fact that most modern games allow the sav-
ing of progress casts doubt on the moral status of the act. 
Imagine a game with an optional side-mission to kill a minor 
villain; if I save before undertaking this mission, complete it, 
then reload and finish the game without replaying the mis-
sion, have I killed the villain? Killed and then resurrected 
him? Expunged my killing of him from the record?
What all of this goes to show is that much hangs on Luck 
and Ellerby’s (2013) ’clarity’. Video game events are hard 
to pin down; establishing for certain that any one virtual 
event belongs to a specific moral category is always going 
to require an interpretive leap. An inflationary metaphysics 
would resolve this by providing a canonical answer: how 
things stand in the virtual world picked out by the game. 
But we could never be sure of this answer, because of how 
limited the information provided by even a highly-detailed 
game is about its world.
Further, to make an inflationary metaphysics plausible 
without extending the gamer’s dilemma to other media, 
some account would be needed of why video games need to 
be explained in terms of virtual worlds where films and nov-
els do not. Brey’s attempt to do this in terms of a formally-
constructed ’realism’ fails because the results are much 
too narrow to capture all relevant cases. If the way that the 
player experiences a game is the source of moral significance 
for acts the player commits or directs inside the game, then 
this can only be accounted for in deflationary terms. We 
must turn from claims about ’virtual worlds’ and ’virtual 
acts’ to questions of images, and their effects and meanings, 
in the real world.
Deflationary views
Deflationary views are at once more heterogenous in their 
moral commitments than inflationary and more unified in 
their metaphysics. It will not be necessary to examine these 
diverse positions in as much depth as the inflationary writ-
ers, precisely because their metaphysics are much less a 
part of the picture. In general, deflationary views take video 
game software as producing images within our world, not 
connecting us to independent virtual worlds. The gamer’s 
action, on these views, is simply to consume these images.
This is evident straight away in Bartel’s (2011) response 
to Luck, quoted above. For Bartel, the problem with a game 
which features child sex abuse, which murder games avoid, 
is that by definition it produces pornographic images of chil-
dren (this claim has been extensively critiqued, especially by 
Stephanie Patridge 2013). Such images are obviously mor-
ally problematic regardless of the circumstances in which 
they are produced.
Bartel’s view expands very naturally to other media. A 
game that features child sex abuse is of a kind with film 
footage of a child being sexually abused—it generates a kind 
of image that one should not generate. Of course, lots of 
other systems can generate such images (even a kaleidoscope 
could, potentially, generate such an image by chance) but 
distinctions can perhaps be made in terms of consistency, 
reliability, or even intent of the designers or consumers; 
more on this last point later.
Stephanie Patridge takes a very similar stance when she 
argues that:
7 To be clear, this is the case with the pedestrians in Grand Theft 
Auto games, and with many kinds of bystanders in many similar 
games. It is not the case in all games; in some games, usually ones 
with less densely-populated environments, such as the Legend of 
Zelda series, non-player characters in the game’s narrative may have 
more persistence.
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Some otherwise imaginative representations, includ-
ing those that we find in videogames, have what I call 
incorrigible social meanings. These representations 
operate to limit the range of reasonable interpretations 
of fictionalized representations. (2010, p. 307)
Here videogames are almost incidental to the point; what 
matters is representations and their semantic connections 
to the real world. When we see a human figure on a screen 
appearing to be, for example, stabbed, what makes this 
image meaningful is its resemblance to real-world wrongs. 
Per Patridge, some such connections are stronger than oth-
ers, because they perpetuate contemporary injustices or draw 
on long histories of oppression.
For Garry Young and Monica Whitty, the question posed 
by the gamer’s dilemma is
whether taboos are context-dependent, so as to match 
the contingent nature of the interactions available 
within a given space—one possible outcome being 
to render certain virtual spaces taboo-free zones. Or 
whether our attitudes toward taboos necessarily tran-
scend worlds, because, along with our wider sense of 
morality, they guide those actions, attitudes, and values 
that, themselves, transcend worlds. (2011, p. 803)
They draw the opposite conclusion to Patridge, arguing 
that while the affective dimension of a taboo, the disgust or 
anger felt at its violation, might transfer over to an in-game 
act, the actual moral weight does not, because the connection 
between the player and agents within the game is not intrin-
sically strong enough to make the agents’ actions the play-
er’s. Young and Whitty’s only remarks about the gamer’s 
actions relate to the psychological attitude from which the 
gamer engages with the images (for example, a gamer who 
played a violent game specifically to use it as pornography 
might rightly be treated with suspicion, but this is framed 
as an atypical case).
In an extensive subsequent body of work (2013, 2014, 
2016), Young has gone on to argue that the gamer’s dilemma 
is not an ethical but a meta-ethical problem. That is, the 
problem is not about whether players engage in particular 
virtual acts, but whether players’ engagement counts as ’pro-
motion’ of certain real-life courses of behaviour. Promoting 
or advocating an immoral act is wrong, but there is wide-
spread disagreement about what features a representation 
must have in order to count as promotional and this, accord-
ing to Young, is where the gamer’s dilemma truly lies.
An advantage of Young’s position is that it sketches a way 
for deflationary theorists to avoid the old empirical question 
of whether playing violent video games causes people to 
behave violently.8 Because they deny that virtual acts really 
are, or are morally assessable as, the real-world acts they 
resemble, deflationary theorists have struggled to explain 
what is wrong with the images they condemn. This is clear-
est in virtue-theoretic responses to the dilemma (most obvi-
ously McCormick (2001) as well as perhaps Thomas Nys 
(2010) and Bartel (2011)) which suggest that the problem 
is the harm players inflict on themselves by playing games 
which cultivate vices, or unvirtuous behaviour.
Indeed, Young’s own argument against the application of 
real morality to in-game acts is that games do not have any 
intrinsic power to change players’ behaviour. With Whitty, 
he writes:
It is our contention, then, that virtual taboo violation 
(in the context of single-player games) is not in and of 
itself psychologically unhealthy. (2011, p. 813)
The advantage of the ’promotion’ frame of Young’s 
later work is that promotion of an immoral act can be a bad 
thing in itself even if ineffective. A hate preacher standing 
on a street corner and calling for violence against a minor-
ity group is doing something wrong even if no-one walks 
past him or hears him. Patridge’s ’incorrigible social mean-
ings’ do similar work with even less of a consequentialist 
inflection.
Two other deflationary theorists merit brief mentions 
here. Geert Gooskens explicitly labels "acting-in-a-virtual-
environment as a form of image-consciousness" (2010, p. 
66), providing a treatment of virtual violence grounded 
in the phenomenological tradition, drawing on Husserl’s 
account of the ’as-if’ relation. Gooskens uses this to dispute 
the application of conventional normative ethics to virtual 
acts, concluding that such acts are never morally prohibited 
but may still be uncomfortable "when they are performed by 
people who have lost track of the distinction between their 
actual I and their (immoral) image-world-I" (69).
Finally, Rami Ali (2015), as quoted previously, draws 
attention to the player’s own understanding of their in-game 
acts, to dispute Luck’s implicit claim that the game soft-
ware itself is the unique authority on what takes place in its 
fiction. To assess players’ actions, we must surely at least 
note what they take themselves to be doing. For Ali, we can 
only fault the player if they understand their own in-game 
actions in the way that the designers intended them to, and 
the designers intended players to consider a particular in-
game action immoral.
8 I suspect this question, at least formulated as I have here, is too 
imprecise to answer, but it is entirely tangential to my argument. The 
standard point of reference on this issue for participants in the gam-
er’s dilemma debate has been Craig Anderson and team’s 2010 meta-
analysis and Christopher Ferguson and John Kilburn’s response (also 
2010).
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These views are all deflationary; they agree that the prob-
lem with a video game that features child sex abuse is to do 
with the fact that such a game produces images, in the real 
world, that appear to represent child sex abuse. There is a 
subtle bifurcation among them, though, about what exactly 
the problem is, and it leads to a different dilemma.
Some writers, most clearly Gooskens, but also Bartel 
in more recent (2020) work, take the moral issue to arise 
when the player engages with the game in some inappro-
priate psychological state. This might be, as Gooskens has 
it, the blurring of the lines between player motivation and 
character motivation, the player taking on the straightfor-
wardly immoral motivations of the character as their own. 
Or, following Bartel, it might be the player deciding to use 
as pornography images which were not intended as such.
On these accounts, the player is primarily a media con-
sumer, approaching their consumption in the wrong way. 
The same problem, then, can also go for other media. A 
consumer who reads a story or watches a documentary about 
child abuse as a surrogate for watching child pornography 
commits the same kind of wrong.
On the other side, where Patridge’s ’incorrigible social 
meanings’ and Young’s ’promotion’ sit, the problem is fun-
damentally with the content of the images themselves, inde-
pendently of anything the player does. Sebastian Ostritsch 
(2017) takes a similar position in protesting games whose 
narratives or scenarios ’endorse’ morally problematic world-
views. Ostritsch goes one step further, though, in arguing 
that the player is not morally implicated in such endorsement 
unless they agree with it.
These two variations of the deflationary view thus fall 
away, in different directions, from the question of the gam-
er’s action. On the former variation, there is nothing specific 
to games about the wrong; all media are subject to this prob-
lem. On the latter, if anything is specific to games then it is 
only in the role of the designers, publishers and distributors 
of games; perhaps the player is complicit in whatever way 
the purchaser of morally compromised goods is complicit, 
but this is generally held to be a relatively trivial wrong 
except in extreme cases.
What makes the gamer’s dilemma compelling as a prob-
lem is that we sense some difference between what the 
gamer does and what other figures—the reader, the movie-
watcher, the listener to music or radio drama—do on their 
sofas. On these deflationary views, this difference disap-
pears; even if we follow Patridge and Young and direct our 
moral scrutiny to the designers and publishers of games, it’s 
not clear that there is anything in what they do to single out 
games from other media.
What I will outline in the final section below is that either 
or both of these forms of the deflationary view can be sharp-
ened in focus by treating the gamer as a kind of performer. 
A performer is more active in a performance than media 
consumers are generally regarded as being, and we might 
well ask Bartel- and Gooskens-style questions about the 
relish a performer might take in playing an immoral role 
or character. Similarly, unlike a ’mere’ consumer, a per-
former plays an important role in the production of media 
and may be critiqued as such along Young’s or Patridge’s 
lines, according to how the symbols they perform relate to 
existing cultural tensions and harms.
Does the gamer do anything?
While much-discussed outside the literature on the gamer’s 
dilemma (see e.g. Kania 2018, whose arguments I do not 
have space to engage with here), the idea that the gamer 
might be a kind of performer has received little interest 
within it. The only author to address it that I am aware of is 
Sebastian Ostritsch, who ultimately argues:
"The moral fault of the actor, I believe, lies in this 
willing exposure of others to an immoral endorsement. 
It is at this point that the analogy with playing games 
breaks down. Since gaming is not inherently public… 
we cannot judge gamers who play an immoral game 
in the same way we judge actors who are part of an 
immoral movie." (2017, p. 126)
This fits Ostritsch’s argument that a media act is immoral 
only if it promotes an immoral viewpoint. But I think it is 
too hasty. Imagine an actor who, in his spare time, rehearses 
scenes from D.W. Griffith’s infamous racist propaganda film 
Birth of a Nation. We would, I think, be alarmed to learn of 
such a person; this behaviour at very least is indicative of a 
lack of respect for the injustices contained in and supported 
by the material. We need not infer any specific form of racist 
animus on the part of the actor; to spend time engaged in this 
activity, even if one does so without any intention to promote 
racist views or political programmes, is racist because the 
performance that results, regardless of audience, is racist 
(i.e. something like Patridge’s incorrigible social meanings 
is at work in it).
To make this picture a little sharper, imagine that instead 
of rehearsing Birth of a Nation by choice, the actor is down 
on his luck and, in desperation, takes a role in a revival pro-
duction backed by a rich white supremacist. Some scenes 
are filmed, but the production falls apart and no film is ever 
released. We are, I think, likely to feel pity for the actor; his 
circumstances forced him to compromise his character for 
money. Such pity assumes that his participation, even though 
it came to nought, is morally problematic.
If the actor’s circumstances were different—if ambition 
and the desire to ingratiate himself to a powerful backer 
motivated him—then we might be more willing to condemn 
him, and even scorn his failure. We would be troubled if, 
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despite asserting a moral objection to the film, he went on 
to take professional pride or even personal relish in the role 
rather than doing the bare minimum to keep the job.
These are, I think, fairly close to the moral contours of 
the gamer’s consumption of a game, and the issues of player 
psychology raised variously by Gooskens, Bartel and Ali 
discussed in the previous section. A gamer is seldom if ever 
forced by circumstance to play a violent game; we assume 
then that they are more like the actor who practices alone 
for his own motives. If we see the gamer take pride in vio-
lent play, or display enjoyment, our discomfort with them 
increases.
And there is a metaphysical difference (at least of degree, 
if not kind) between the actor and the watcher of a movie. 
An actor is ontologically bound up with even a rehearsal 
of a scene to a degree that a media consumer is not. Yes, a 
media consumer is a necessary condition for the scene they 
consume to be consumed—someone must press ’play’, or 
buy a ticket, or open a book—but that is all; media can be 
consumed ’in the background’ or ’as background noise’. An 
actor’s participation in a scene is a constant stream of small 
actions, each of which is a constituent of the scene. Deci-
sions the actor makes—how to stand, to speak, to gesture—
are essential to the work, not in the sense that what the actor 
chooses is transformatively significant to the narrative, but 
in the sense that some such decision must be reached for the 
performance to occur.
This, I think, accounts for the strong and common intui-
tion that the gamer is a kind of agent, and allows us to get the 
scope of their agency right. The gamer does not any more 
choose to kill zombies, or aliens, or enemy soldiers than the 
reader of a book about the same events—generally speaking, 
violent encounters in games tend to be structured to require 
these killings just as much as reading a book requires turn-
ing a page. But the gamer has more say in how the killing 
happens, in how the act is represented (as a simple example, 
one gamer may prefer to use a shotgun weapon for the sense 
of immediate power it provides; another may use a chainsaw 
instead to generate gratuitous gore9). The gamer typically 
makes many of these little decisions around the restrictions 
of the ’script’ provided by the game.
A performer is at once a limited agent and the first and 
most immediate consumer of their own performance, as 
any musician who practices regularly will attest. To per-
form is simultaneously to be aware of one’s performance; 
in performing one considers potential audience perspectives 
through one’s own. There is not space to develop this point 
here, but the broader understanding of ’performance’ in the 
philosophy of gender following Judith Butler (1990) would 
enrich this argument still further.
Whether the performance of the gamer is different in 
degree or kind from the engagement of a media consumer 
is another question that will have to wait for further work. 
It is worth noting in this context Kendall Walton’s (1990) 
argument that the reader of a book is far from passive, but in 
fact conducts what might be called an internal performance 
of the text. At very least, performers make a useful point 
of comparison for the gamer and bear more investigation 
as such.
If we take the gamer to be (like) a kind of performer, 
then the gamer’s dilemma falls under the broader question of 
what sorts of performance are morally permissible to engage 
in. This is a complex question with a long history, including 
debates about freedom of expression, obscenity, propaganda, 
the promotion of taboo or immoral views and political pro-
grammes and many more issues besides. The commercial 
structures that exist around any morally problematic perfor-
mance (who profits from the representation of whom) are 
as important as the performer’s own psychology, intent, and 
understanding of their performance, as are the perceptions 
of diverse groups of outside observers.
What makes the difference, for example, between an actor 
taking a role in a remake of Birth of a Nation, and an actor 
taking the role of Macbeth in Shakespeare’s play? Macbeth 
certainly commits atrocities, but we would regard as prudish 
in the extreme someone who called for the banning of his 
play. I do not propose to answer this question here, merely 
to point out that any answer would be far more complex 
than those proposed thus far to the gamer’s dilemma—and 
that we should expect any actual satisfactory answer to the 
gamer’s dilemma to be similarly complex.
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